Model by Matej Steinbacher et al.
A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting 
Model 
 
 
Matej Steinbacher 
matej.steinbacher@gmail.com 
 
Matjaz Steinbacher 
matjaz.steinbacher@gmail.com 
 
Mitja Steinbacher 
mitja.steinbacher@gmail.com 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the paper, we simulate a heterogeneous-agent version of the wage-posting model as derived by 
Montgomery (1991) with homogeneous workers and differently-productive employers. Wage policy of 
particular employer is positively correlated with employer’s productivity level and the wage policy of 
the competitor. However, it is a less productive employer whose wage posting could also outweigh the 
posting of a more productive employer, though only temporarily. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the paper, we simulate a heterogeneous-agent wage-posting model of Montgomery 
(1991). Employers in the model announce their wage posts in a repeated non-
cooperative game and workers apply to vacancies. All bargaining power is given to 
employers while workers only direct their job search according to their preferences. 
Workers in the model have complete knowledge about all posted wages and can make 
one job application. They do it uncooperatively which could lead to the situation 
where both apply to the same employer while leaving the other vacancy with no 
applications. 
 
All job-postings in the model offer the same expected benefits to workers, should they 
apply. For instance, vacancies that offer lower wages attract smaller number of job 
applicants, thus raising each applicant’s likelihood of being hired. Both employers in 
the model are differently-productive and their productivities develop according to the 
geometric Brownian motion. Employers in the model condition their wage policies 
according to the wage posted by each other and in relation to their own productivity 
levels. 
 
Simulation results show that it is less productive employer whose productivity level is 
the main loadstar in the wage-setting process, while the wage policy of the more 
productive employer much less persistently concurs with his productivity level. It 
could also happen, although only temporarily, that it is a less productive employer 
whose wage-offer could be higher than that of the more productive employer. 
 
In addition, we test the effects of intrinsic costs related to uncertainty, which 
employers face when changing the alternative, on the behavior of the model. This 
means that employer is not prone to changing current alternative, especially when it is 
expected that the benefit of adopting a new alternative would be relatively small. 
Rubinstein (1998) defines such behavior by the tradeoff between complexity and 
efficiency of alternatives, where agents (employers in our case) prefer efficient and 
simple alternatives.
1 The inclusion of intrinsic costs into the decision-making does not 
change the behavior of the model significantly and only smoothes the wage policy. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Model is derived in Chapter 2, and simulations are 
performed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 summarizes simulation results, and the last chapter 
concludes. 
 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The model resembles a simple 22 ×  case from Montgomery (1991). Suppose that the 
labor market consists of two identical and anonymous workers and two differentially 
productive employers, each having one vacancy. Then both employers non-
cooperatively post wage w as to maximize their profit π . Both workers observe the 
postings and uncooperatively apply each to one job application. Employer that 
                                                 
1 For the literature review on the role of behavioral studies on the decision-making, see Hirshleifer 
(2001). receives at least one application employs a worker at the promised wage w, and starts 
producing the output v. Job posting without an application remains vacant. 
 
Under a non-cooperative repeated game-setting workers apply to the first employer 
with probability  p  and to the second employer with probability () 1 p − .
2 If both 
workers apply to the same vacancy, then the employer randomly chooses one 
applicant while leaving the other unemployed. The following output matrix applies: 
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In the first case worker 1 applies to employer 1 and worker 2 applies to employer 2, in 
the second case worker 1 applies to employer 2 and worker 2 applies to employer 1, 
and in a mixed strategy both workers apply to both employers with the probability 
5 . 0 . Solving for  p  in a mixed Nash equilibrium yields: 
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Employers can increase the probability of receiving an application to the vacancy by 
offering higher wage. That is to be expected in our case of differently-productive 
employers, where an empty vacancy of the more productive employer is more costly. 
However, higher wages attract more job applications thus lowering the probability for 
an individual worker to getting a higher-paid job thus preserving the equality of both 
wages’ expected values. 
 
A filled vacancy at the employer i produces a product of  , it v .  , it v  is normally 
distributed random variable that develops in time around 0.5 by a geometric 
Brownian motion with known drift µ  and known variance 
2 σ  and is defined as 
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, ~, it Z Ntt µ σ  is a Wiener process. Over time both employers observe output 
realizations so they can regularly update their beliefs about its value and solve their 
maximization problem: 
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2 As workers are assumed to be homogeneous they must apply with the same probability to particular 
vacancy if they are to maximize their expected benefit.  
Second expression in (2) depicts the probability that the employer i receives at least 
one job application. Using (1) for  i p  and inserting it into the profit-maximization 
equation (2), alters the maximization problem:
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Solving (3) for both employers gives us their reaction functions, representing their 
best responses to each other's wage posting strategy: 
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Wage posted by a particular employer is in a positive correlation with the wage posted 
by other employer and employer’s productivity level. 
 
 
SIMULATIONS 
 
The model consists of two employers  { } 1, 2 i =  each of whom solves his own 
optimization problem as given in (3). All the decision-making in an algorithm is 
iterated forward in time for  1,2,...,1000 t = . To eliminate the dependency of results to 
initial conditions we discarded first hundred realizations, thus leaving additional 900 
for further study. Both employers simultaneously condition their wage selections in 
time  t according to each other’s selection in time  1 t −  and their own productivity 
levels in time t, respectively. To fit the algorithm we rewrite the optimization 
problem as given by (3): 
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The decision function to be maximized in each period t is continuous, concave, and 
differentiable on the defined convex set  ( ) 0,1 D∈ . This means it has a unique 
maximum that is easily found by a line-search optimization. The decision-making 
algorithm works as follows:
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Initialization: choose initial 
0
, it w  and other parameter values 
                                                 
3  i −  stands for the not i  employer. 
4 The algorithm is not optimized for speed. Step 1: evaluate maximization function  ( ) ,,
k
it it w π . 
Step 2: 
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Step 3: if  () ( )
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+ −> , go to step 1, else go to step 4. 
Step 4: quit iteration and report  ,
k
it w  as the optimum wage posted by employer i in 
time t,  , it w , and proceed with the  1 t + . 
 
To allow for the intrinsic costs of changing current wage policy, the logistic (Fermi) 
probability function is used as a driving mechanism to the employers' wage-setting 
process: 
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Probability that the wage is regularly updated in each period t is a function of wage 
differential and  () 0,1 κ ∈ . Parameter κ  defines the susceptibility to change the wage 
policy and the smaller the parameter the larger the probability that employer follows 
his own optimal strategy and vice versa. The rule to adopt a new wage in each period 
becomes: if  () ,, 1 it it ran F w w − <←  then  ,, it it ww = , else  ,, 1 it it ww − = , with  () ~0 , 1 ran U  
being an i.i.d. random number. Simulations are performed for  { } 0,0.01,0.25 κ =↓  
and the results are averaged over 5 realizations. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the development of productivity levels for both employers for the 
900 observations we kept. As can be seen from the figure, geometric Brownian 
motion is set such as to allow only for minor changes in productivity of each 
employer; parameters are set to  0.005 µ =  and 
2 0.002 σ = . To preserve the mutual 
comparability of simulation results we used these same productivity dataset in all 
simulation repetitions. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Geometric Brownian motion realizations. Black line depicts the 
development of  1,t v  and red line depicts the development of  2,t v . RESULTS 
 
Simulation results are depicted on Figure 2. The figure depicts the iteration process of 
the wage policy under  { } 0,0.01 κ =↓ . For  { } 0.01,0.25 κ =  simulations produced 
equal results. That is why we excluded the latter from the further study. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Optimal wage time-path.  ( ) 12 :: black w red w  is the wage rate of 
employer 1 (2) when  0 κ ↓ ,  ( ) 1, 2, :: green w blue w κ κ  is the wage rate of employer 1 
(2) when  0.01 κ =  
 
It is as expected that both heterogeneous employers post different wage offers. We 
have mentioned that higher wages increase the probability of receiving at least one job 
application. That is why we would expect that more productive employer whose 
vacancy is more costly posts higher wage offer. However, in some cases of minor 
productivity differences when a stochastic factor could suddenly change the 
productivity order of both employers, a less productive employer might offer higher 
wage for a very short time. It is Shi (2006) who also noted that in case of very small 
productivity differentials a less productive worker might get a higher wage offer 
(although in her case for other reasons). 
 
We found from the simulations that the less productive employer dictates the wage 
policy for both, irrespective of the κ  value. Partial correlation coefficients show that 
less productive employer entirely manages his wage policy according to his 
productivity level 
11 , 0.97 wv ρ = , but much less upon the productivity level of his more 
productive counterpart, 
12 , 0.14 wv ρ = . Many researchers predict a positive relation 
between wages and job productivity levels, as, for instance, Shimer (2005) or Abowd 
et al. (1999). 
 
The behavior of the more productive employer is, however, different. His wage policy 
correlates mainly with the other employer’s wage policy, 
21 , 0.89 ww ρ =  (and consequently also with his productivity level, 
21 , 0.76 wv ρ = ), and much less with his 
own productivity level, 
21 , 0.56 wv ρ = . 
 
Such conclusion makes sense. A profit-maximizing employer, in order to minimize 
his wage-bill, offers slightly larger wage than his lower-productive counterpart, 
irrespective of his own productivity level, insofar the productivity advantage over the 
other is large enough. 
 
Now, let us have a closer look at the influence of κ  on how the optimal wages of both 
employers from our model develop in time. It is clear from Figure 2 and Figure 3 that 
,0 w κ ⋅↓ is very close to  ,0 . 0 1 w κ ⋅= . 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Relative difference in the wage policy for  { } 0,0.01 κ =↓ . Red line shows 
() ()
0.01 0 0
22 , 2 ,2 , / tt t ww ww
κκ κ =↓ ↓ ′ =−  and black line shows  ( ) ( )
0.01 0 0
11 , 1 ,1 , / tt t ww ww
κκ κ =↓ ↓ ′ =− . 
 
The differences for  1 w  and  2 w  as shown in Figure 3 are low with mean and median 
being close to zero and show the correlation coefficient of 
21 , 0.77 ww ρ ′′ = . The max-min 
spread is close to 0.8%  and the difference from the optimal policy is largest for  1 w , 
ranging from  0.37% −  to 0.46%. Such small deviations from the optimal wage setting 
are mostly due to the minor changes in productivity. In case of small changes the 
Fermi function entails that on average only every second “optimal” decision is 
accepted.  
 
The inclusion of the intrinsic costs in the form of the Fermi function narrowed both 
employers’ wage policy bands for 1.6%  in case of  1 w  and for 3.3% in case of  2 w . 
Such smoothing is something we would expect because what the Fermi function does 
in the algorithm is affecting only the decision of the particular employer either to 
move from the current “optimal” wage to the new “optimal” wage or not. Therefore, 
the solution of the original model without κ  characterizes an outer wage bound, 
which could only be narrowed. 
 CONCLUSION 
 
In the paper, we test a 2 2 ×  heterogeneous-agent version of the wage posting model 
as derived by Montgomery (1991). Homogeneous workers in the model are allowed to 
make only one job application to differently-productive employers. Simulations 
predict that the wage-policy is in a positive relation to the employer’s productivity 
level. However, simulation results also indicate that it is a less productive employer, 
who can post higher wage than more productive employer, though only temporarily. 
The inclusion of intrinsic costs only smoothes the wage-path, with negligible effects 
to the basic simulation results. The max-min spread deviation from the “optimal” 
wage-posting is less than 1 percent. Such a low difference is basically due to the 
minor changes in productivity of the employers. 
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